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PUNISHMENT AND THE WILD BEAST OF
PREY: THE PROBLEM OF
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
MICHAEL LOUIS CORRADO*
Of course, the moral education theory says nothing about whether the
execution of criminals might be justified not as punishment but as a
method of "legitimate elimination" of criminals who are judged to have
lost all of their essential humanity, making them wild beasts of prey on a
community that must, to survive, destroy them. Whether such ajustifica-
tion of criminal execution can be morally tolerable is something I do not
want to explore here.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent work on the philosophy of punishment is deeply unsatisfy-
ing. While the criminal law expands to include forfeitures where
there has been no conviction and detention based on dangerousness,
philosophers and legal commentators continue on as if the problem
of punishment were some hothouse specimen, ignoring the jungle
outside the window. In a world where the perception of dangerous-
ness has led to dangerous remedies, philosophers either turn a blind
eye, insisting that the state can't restrict freedom except for a crime
committed-in spite of the fact that the state does, and in some cases
must, restrict freedom where there has been no crime at all-or else
they defer that problem to another time.
We cannot defer the issue any longer. Too much is happening.
The Supreme Court has said that the limitations upon the state's au-
thority to punish do not apply to detention for dangerousness because
it is not punishment but regulation.2 What does that do to our motto
that no one should be punished except for a crime? It passes it by and
leaves us wondering what the limitations on regulation are, and
whether there is now any point in talking about the limitations on
* University of North Carolina Law School.
'Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PuB. Arr. 208,
223 (1984).
2 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). See infra notes 8-22 and accompa-
nying text.
778
1996] PUNISHMENT AND THE WILD BEAST OF PREY 779
punishment. In a more recent case, however, the Court did seem to
pull back,3 holding that when someone was acquitted by reason of
insanity, the state could not continue to detain him after he regained
his sanity, even .if he remained dangerous.4 This seems to mean that
detention on grounds of dangerousness was not permissible after all.
But as Justice O'Connor made clear in her concurring opinion, the
states may eliminate the insanity defense altogether,5 which means
that people innocent of crimes because of insanity would be convicted
and imprisoned nevertheless-a good functional substitute for deten-
tion on grounds of dangerousness. 6
These issues have come to the Court's attention because legisla-
tures, under the press of popular outrage, have acted to put danger-
ous people away by restricting the insanity defense, by denying bail on
grounds of dangerousness, and by passing sex offender and habitual
criminal statutes that punish out of proportion to the crime. These
are important things happening in the criminal law, but we do not
have any clear sense of how to talk about them. Most of our thought
has been given to punishment, but punishment and detention on
grounds of dangerousness are two different things. Thus, the fact that
no one may be punished unless they have committed a crime is no
reason, by itself, to think that pure preventive detention is wrong. At
the same time, there is something very disturbing about taking away
the personal freedom of someone who has not yet violated the crimi-
nal law. Although this feeling is difficult to articulate, it seems to have
something to do with the notion of freedom-the notion that some-
one who is still capable of choosing and acting freely has not yet for-
feited his right to do so. It is hard to give any meaning to this
intuition without falling into the worst sort of platitude. It is certainly
not enough to argue, as some have, that the mere fact of human free-
dom is self-evidently an obstacle to preventive detention.7 It is not; if
it were self-evident, everyone who gave serious thought to the matter
would be able to see it, and that just has not happened.
My aim in this Article is to begin to develop a theory that will
make sense of these competing ideas-that pure preventive detention
is appropriate in some situations as the only solution to a grave social
problem, on the one hand, and that it is never appropriate because it
3 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992). See supra notes 23-28 and accompa-
nying text.
4 Id. at 83.
5 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 See Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless
Offenders, 83J. CAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 702-03 (1993).
7 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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is an attack on freedom, on the other. It is indeed the freedom of the
actor that stands in the way of a simple right to detain. But the way in
which it does that is rather complex, and the argument to that effect is
not, I confess, a knock-down argument. However, it does salvage what
there is of good sense in the notion that the problem is human free-
dom, and it does suggest a middle ground.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION
A. SA L ERNWO
In 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States decided, in
United States v. Salerno,8 that detention of dangerous individuals was
not punishment but regulation, and therefore, detention fell outside
the limits the Constitution drew around the institution of punish-
ment.9 It was not punishment, the Court held, because it was not in-
tended as punishment' 0-a point not easily dismissed. An essential
element of our current understanding of punishment is the intent to
punish. Mere infliction of pain or restriction of freedom is not pun-
ishment unless it is intentional, and is in response to some offense,
real or perceived.
The issue in Salerno was the recent Bail Reform Act under which
bail could be denied to those accused of crimes on the basis of dan-
gerousness alone, even if no threat to the adjudicatory process (like
flight or intimidation of witnesses) existed." The defendants in the
case had protested that such pretrial detention, based solely on the
ground that they were dangerous, was punishment of the innocent.
They charged that those who were merely accused and not yet con-
victed were innocent in the eyes of the law; while they could be de-
tained to insure their appearance at trial, they could not be detained
on the ground that they were dangerous to the community. The de-
fense argued that to detain them on the latter grounds would be
analogous to punishing them for future crimes and therefore, would
be unconstitutional. 12
These arguments had found favor in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, 13 which explains the government's determination to have
the case heard by the Supreme Court despite the fact that the case was
8 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
9 Id. at 747, 752.
10 Id. at 747.
11 Id. at 742 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. HI 1985), amended by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e) (1994)).
12 Id. at 744.
13 United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1986).
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technically moot 14 The government's determination was rewarded
when the Court held that the pretrial detention provisions were not
unconstitutional:
The mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the
conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. To deter-
mine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punish-
ment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent. Unless
Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the puni-
tive/regulatory distinction turns on "whether an alternative purpose to
which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned [to it]." Congress... perceived pretrial detention as a poten-
tial solution to a pressing societal problem. There is no doubt that prevent-
ing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatoy goal 15
This maneuver may remind you of the "definitional stop" argu-
ment (as Hart called it) in defense of utilitarianism.16 When the re-
tributivist says that an exclusive interest in utility would justify
punishing the innocent, the utilitarian replies: "But that wouldn't be
punishment at all, since punishment is by definition something im-
posed on a person for a crime he has committed!" As Hart pointed
out, it is not a very persuasive argument.17 Our aim isn't to label im-
prisonment of the innocent as something other than punishment; we
want to determine whether and why it is wrong. And so we might
reply to the Court: you have sidestepped the issue by calling it "regu-
lation"; you can't make imprisoning the innocent acceptable just by
calling it regulation.
And yet, why not? We do allow the state to deprive people of
freedom in cases in which it is not meant as punishment; and when it
is not meant as punishment, we do not insist on the safeguards that
punishment requires. Taxation restricts freedom; enforced military
service restricts freedom; quarantine of those with contagious diseases
restricts freedom. Whatever we think of those impositions, it would be
foolish to insist that they could be imposed only on people who had
committed crimes. The law restricts our freedom when it permits zon-
ing ordinances. We think such restictions are justified when they are
called for by the general welfare. We may believe that compensation
14 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 756-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 746-47 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
16 See H.LA HART, Prolegamenon to the Principles of Punishmen in PUNISHMENT AND R-
sPONsiBiLrrY 1, 5 (1968).
17 Id. at 5. The fallacy arises from a way of defining punishment that excludes
"[p]unishment of persons... who neither are in fact or supposed to be offenders." Id.
Hart himself proposes to add to the definition of the "standard case" of punishment four
"secondary cases," one of which is punishment of persons "who neither are nor are sup-
posed to be offenders." Id. at 4-5.
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is required when property rights are limited, but it would seem odd to
suppose that only the property of convicted criminals can be zoned.
So what should prevent the legislature from detaining those who
are innocent, if they are found to be dangerous? The Court in Salerno
was dealing with a statute that limited such treatment to those in-
dicted for, though not yet convicted of, serious crimes.' 8 The diffi-
culty lies in finding a principle that would limit the justification of
detention to just those cases. Certainly, the Salerno Court did not suc-
ceed in doing so. In general terms, the Court said, that "[there is no
doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regula-
tory goal."19 Then, the Court stated that "[w]e have repeatedly held
that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty inter-
est."20 The Court then pointed out that, "as our cases hold, this right
[to liberty] may, in circumstances where the government's interest is
sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the needs of society."2'
Of course, with regard to punishment, the government is not en-
titled to balance the needs of society against the individual's liberty
interest. Before he can be punished, an individual must be found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, to have violated an existing criminal pro-
hibition, within the confines of a proper criminal trial. But when it
comes to "preventing danger to the community," it is apparently a
matter of weighing and balancing, and nothing the Court said indi-
cated how the right of the legislature to regulate such cases could be
limited to pretrial detention. When the threat is serious enough, we
may infer, that it is appropriate to detain dangerous persons who are
innocent in the eyes of the law.22
B. FOUCHA
Foucha v. Louisiana2 3 was a case involving a young man accused of
aggravated burglary and the illegal discharge of a firearm. 24 On the
evidence of two experts, Foucha was found not guilty by reason of
insanity and, under Louisiana law, was committed to a mental hospital
18 481 U.S. at 743.
'9 Id. at 747.
20 Id. at 748.
21 Id. at 750-51.
22 The extent of this power depends on what the legislature may designate as danger-
ous. In this regard, the Supreme Court has not been very reassuring. In Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 (1983), the Court said that dangerousness need not involve
violence.
23 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
24 Id. at 73.
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"until such time as doctors recommend that he be released."2 5 In
1988, the institution in which he was being held recommended that
he be released because he was no longer insane.2 6 A panel of two
doctors appointed by the trial court also found that he was no longer
insane.27 The court refused to release him, however, because the
panel was unwilling to certify that he was no longer dangerous.28 The
continued detention of Foucha was therefore the detention of a sane
and innocent, but dangerous individual, a perfect case for testing the
implications of Salerno.
If Foucha was no longer insane, and had never been found guilty
of a crime, by what authority was he denied release? The hitch was in
the Louisiana statute governing release of those committed after in-
sanity acquittals. The statute required the detainee to prove before
his release that he was no longer dangerous. 29 An older requirement
that the detainee be released unless the state could demonstrate he
was both insane and dangerous had led to a general reaction against
releasing dangerous individuals into the community. A number of
states adopted statutes like Louisiana's, shifting the burden of proof to
the detainee and requiring proof both that he was sane and that he
was no longer dangerous, not just one or the other80 This prevented
dangerous persons from being released.
The Supreme Court declared the Louisiana statute, and all such
statutes, invalid:
A State, pursuant to its police power, may of course imprison convicted
criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution. But there are
constitutional limitations on the conduct that a State may criminalize.
Here, the State has no such punitive interest. As Foucha was not convicted,
he may not be punished. Here, Louisiana has by reason of his acquittal
exempted Foucha from criminal responsibility.3 '
It is true that the State had no punitive intent, if "punitive intent"
refers to deterrence or retribution. It was not the intention of the
State to make an example of Foucha-at least it was not the explicit
intention of the State to do that, and it is perfectly plausible that the
State would have kept his continued detention quiet, if it could have.
The State was not paying Foucha back for what he had done; he
25 Id. at 74.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 74-75.
29 LA. CODE CGaM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West 1981), amended by LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1996).
30 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-276.1 (1991), amended by N.C. Gr_. STAT. § 122C-276.1
(1995).
31 504 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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hadn't been convicted of any crime. This is not a case in which there
was a doubt about the insanity claim; Foucha's mind had been so af-
fected by drugs that he did not know what he was doing.3 2 One basis
for believing he continued to be dangerous was the possibility that he
might use drugs again, and thus lose control again.33
But if the State had no punitive intent, then this was not punish-
ment. Remember that according to the Salerno Court, "[t]o deter-
mine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible
punishment or permissible regulation, we look first to legislative in-
tent. Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restric-
tions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on 'whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it. . . ."'34 Under the broad language of Sa-
lerno, the Foucha Court should have upheld the Louisiana statute.
Instead, the Court treated his detention as punishment rather than
regulation, and denied the right of the State to punish him.
Unfortunately, the Court did not draw upon any very clear princi-
ple in doing so, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent.3 5 The
Court did not overrule Salerno, and, more importantly, Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence urged that Foucha would stand as no
bar to states that wanted to eliminate the insanity defense entirely,
and hold dangerous persons by this means.36 An insane person is
morally innocent of crime, of course. But if a state crossed the in-
sanity defense off its books entirely, the insane person could be con-
victed though morally innocent, and the injunction against punishing
someone who had not been convicted would not apply.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has never held that due process re-
quires an insanity defense, and several states do not have that de-
fense.3 7 The elimination of the insanity defense provides, within the
limits of the criminal law, a means of detaining those who are sane
and innocent but dangerous. Once the person who was insane when
the crime was committed has recovered his sanity, he will continue to
serve his sentence just like any other criminal. Someone in that con-
dition is sane and innocent, but (perhaps) dangerous.38 They are not
32 Id. at 74.
33 Id. at 74 n.2.
34 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-747 (1987) (citations omitted).
35 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Invalidating this quite reasonable
scheme is bad enough; even worse is the Court's failure to explain precisely what is wrong
with it.").
36 504 U.S. at 88-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37 Id.
38 No determination that he continues to be dangerous would be necessary, though
their above average dangerousness is clearly the reason for keeping this class of persons
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legally innocent, it is true. But they are morally innocent, and the fact
that they are not also considered legally innocent is an indication of
how far the law has strayed from its traditional moral bearings injuris-
dictions that eliminate the defense. Foucha does not, therefore, draw
a line that will protect the innocent but dangerous from punishment.
C. SEX OFFENDER STATUTES
Nor is it clear that Foucha's protection extends to those who have
paid the price and served their time and are innocent in that sense,
but remain dangerous. For example, may a sexual offender be de-
tained after serving his sentence, on the ground that he is still danger-
ous? What of a convicted drug dealer who has served his sentence?
What of any violent offender who has been convicted several times?
Does dangerousness alone give the state the right to regulate the free-
dom of those individuals?
Take, for example, state laws governing the detention of sexual
offenders. The older laws, sometimes called "sexual psychopath laws,"
provided for detention as an alternative to punishment for those who
had committed sexual crimes and who were found to have a,"propen-
sity" to commit such crimes again.39 The newer versions, known as
"sexual predator laws," provide for detention of such persons after the
completion of a prison sentence for a sexual crime.40 These laws are
the result of public outcry resulting from sensationalized cases of sex-
ual assault.41 The detention is said to be civil rather than criminal, but
there need not be any finding that the criminal is psychologically or
medically insane. Instead, such offenders are generally said to suffer
from an antisocial disposition and to be psychopaths. Detention is
indefinite until the detainee is shown no longer to be dangerous.
The validity of one state's sexual offender statute was challenged
in Allen v. Illinois.42 The petitioner had been charged but not yet con-
victed of a sexual offense. 43 Under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act Act, the court ordered him examined by two psychiatrists,
and on the basis of the testimony of those doctors and of the "victim
of the sexual assault for which [he] had been indicted," he was de-
incarcerated.
39 For a discussion of the history of these laws, seeJohn LaFond, Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control 15 U. PuGEr
SouND L. RPv. 655, 659-663 (1992). This article appears in an issue of the University of
Puget Sound Law Review devoted to Washington's new sexual predator law.
40 Id. at 670-84.
41 Id.
42 478 U.S. 364, 365 (1986).
43 Id. at 365-66.
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clared to be a sexually dangerous person.44 Persons so adjudged
under the Act were committed to a maximum security institution for
convicts needing psychiatric care, to be released when they had
demonstrated that they were no longer dangerous. 45 So confinement
under the sexual offender laws is not punishment.
Allen appealed, partly on the grounds that the psychiatrists had
elicited information from him that violated his right against self-
incrimination. 46 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this appeal on
the ground that proceedings under the act were civil and not crimi-
nal, whereas the right not to have to incriminate oneself applies only
to criminal proceedings. 47 When the case reached the United States
Supreme Court the question was whether detention under the Act was
punitive in nature, thereby triggering the Fifth Amendment protec-
tions against compulsory self-incrimination. 48
The Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court.49 The Court's
reasoning, apart from rebuttals to particular arguments advanced by
the petitioner, follows:
The State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for the
treatment of those it commits, and established a system under which
committed persons may be released after the briefest time in confine-
ment.50 The Act thus does not appear to promote either of "the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence."51
And it concluded that the petitioner failed to show that his confine-
ment was not aimed at treatment; the record contained little about
the regimen at the psychiatric center. "We therefore cannot say that
the conditions of petitioner's confinement themselves amount to
44 Id. at 366.
45 Id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46 See id. at 367.
47 Id. at 368.
48 See id. at 365, 374.
49 Id. at 368.
50 That is, as soon as the detainee has proved himself no longer dangerous-which
might be quite a long time indeed. The Court is simply referring to the fact that when the
detainee does succeed in proving himself to be nondangerous, he will shortly be released.
Indeed, the dissent noted that "the sexually-dangerous-person proceeding authorizes far
longer imprisonment than a mere finding of guilt on an analogous criminal charge." Id. at
377. The dissent also referenced another case under the same Act:
Stachulak was originally charged with Indecent Solicitation of a Child .... That of-
fense carried a maximum penalty of a $500 fine and less than one year imprisonment
in a penal institution other than a penitentiary. Instead of prosecuting him on that
charge, the state brought a proceeding, which culminated in an indeterminate com-
mitment, under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. For the last five years, Stachulak
has been confined at the Psychiatric Division of the Illinois State Penitentiary at
Menard, a maximum-security penal institution.
Id. at 377 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex reL Stachulak v. Coughlin,
520 F.2d 931, 936 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976)).
5' Id. at 370 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
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'punishment' and thus render 'criminal' the proceedings which led to
confinement."52 Thus, confinement under the Illinois sexual of-
fender law was not punishment.53
Confinement is not commitment of the insane either. What dis-
tinguishes those detained under these sexual offender acts is a pro-
pensity to commit sexual offenses. For the purposes of the law, these
are not people who can be found insane; if they were, there would be
no need for special sex offender laws. Those detained are sometimes
said to be mentally ill. Indeed, the Illinois statute referred to a mental
disorder.5 4 Usually, however, the only evidence of such a disorder is a
propensity to commit sexual crimes, and the only evidence of sq~ch a
propensity is the fact that the offender has committed or has teen
charged with committing such crimes. For example, the Washington
State sexual predator statute definesa sexually violent predator as:
any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disor-
der which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility.55
And what is a mental abnormality in Washington?
"Mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition affect-
ing the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such per-
52 Id. at 374. Some think that what distinguishes punishment from civil commitment is
the stigma that goes with punishment. But it would be foolish to think that there is no
stigma attached to being detained as a sexually dangerous person. As Justice Stevens
stated, "the stigma associated with an adjudication as a 'sexually dangerous person' is at
least as great as that associated with most criminal convictions and 'is certainly more damn-
ing than a finding ofjuvenile delinquency.'" Id. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Coughlin, 520 F.2d at 936).
53 See id. at 374. According to the dissent:
A goal of treatment is not sufficient, in and of itself, to render inapplicable the Fifth
Amendment, or to prevent a characterization of proceedings as "criminal." With re-
spect to a conventional criminal statute, if a State declared that its goal was "treat-
ment" and "rehabilitation," it is obvious that the Fifth Amendment would still apply.
The sexually-dangerous-person proceeding similarly may not escape a characterization
as "criminal" simply because a goal is treatment. If this were not the case, moreover, noth-
ing would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of "dangerous person" statutes to
shadow its criminal code. Indeterminate commitment would derive from proven viola-
tions of criminal statutes, combined with findings of mental disorders and "criminal
propensities," and constitutional protections for criminal defendants would be simply
inapplicable.
Id. at 381 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens' admonition about
what could be the case if a goal of treatment could determine that something was not
punishment must be taken seriously, since in the eyes of the majority it does just that.
Fringes of the shadow code thatJustice Stevens warns of may be seen in the new federal
crime act.
54 Itt. REV. STAT., Ch. 38, 1 105-1.01 (1985).
55 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West Supp. 1996).
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son a menace to the health and safety of others.56
Personality disorders and mental abnormalities, as defined, include
for example "paraphilias." The Supreme Court of Washington, up-
holding the statute in a recent case, appealed to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders' definition of "paraphilia:" "the
essential features of a paraphiliac mental illness are 'recurrent intense
sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies generally involving either
(1) nonhuman objects, (2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or
one's partner (not merely simulated), or (3) children or other non-
consenting persons."57 A person who suffers from such urges and fan-
tasies may want to get rid of them, which perhaps justifies classifying
the condition as a mental illness. But most normal people have had
intense sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies (directed perhaps
at more socially acceptable objects), and we know that the force of
such urges and fantasies does not deprive us of responsibility for our
actions. For all the definition of paraphilia shows, a sexual predator
may not be different from anyone else in his psychological makeup,
except as to the object of his desires. What seems to qualify him as a
"mentally ill" sexual predator is the fact that he has committed sexual
crimes.
If it is recognized that sexual offender laws aim at incapacitating
people who are sane in the legal sense and who have either served the
allotted time for their crime or have not been convicted of any crime,
then the question arises how these statutes are to be treated after
Foucha. Allen used the same reasoning that Salerno used in distinguish-
ing detention from punishment, and that reasoning was rejected in
Foucha in connection with not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity detainees
who had regained their sanity. But Foucha did not overrule Salerno,
which is still the law in connection with pretrial detention. The ques-
tion, therefore, is what direction will the law take in the near future?
Will sexual offender and similar laws be upheld as falling outside the
limitations on punishment, or will the Court say of those detainees
that because they have not been convicted, they cannot be punished?
D. THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION
When we move from the constitutional issue raised by preventive
detention to the moral issue ofjustification, we find that philosophers
have not had very much to say about this problem. We might imagine
a direct legislative utilitarian58 arguing, as Justice Rehnquist did, that
56 Id. § 71.09.020(2).
57 In reYoung, 857 P.2d 989, 1002 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
58 By "direct legislative utilitarian," I mean one who believes that the power of the legis-
lature to act should be governed by some form of direct utilitarianism, whatever moral
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it is merely a matter of weighing one alternative against another, and
if detaining the dangerous increases the general welfare more than
any alternative, then that is what the legislature should do.
The problem, of course, is that this line of reasoning would eat
up the justification for punishment. At the very least, it would render
the limitations upon the state's power to punish meaningless. The
state would be justified in punishing when it was useful, but that
power would be contained in the general power to detain, which
would be justified when useful. Although the state may not punish
except for past crimes-and only when the crime was committed by
the person to be punished and under laws in effect when the crime
was committed-the utilitarian power to detain would extend to de-
tention whenever useful.
If we find a simple utilitarian approach to be distasteful, we might
look to other traditional theories for an answer. We might interpret
the retributivist dictum about punishing the innocent to extend to all
forms of detention: no one may be detained by the state except for past
crimes. In such an interpretation the dictum becomes more than an
exposition of the meaning of "punishment"; it becomes a genuine lim-
itation upon the power of the state to detain. Not only may no one be
punished except for a past crime, but no one may be denied bail.
And no one, certainly, may be detained simply on the grounds that he
might commit a crime in the future. Thus, the preventive detention
of sexual "predators," a matter of great recent interest, would simply
be prohibited.
But why should the power to detain be limited in that way? The
limitation on punishment has the support of the traditional defini-
tion, but what reason is there to say that the state may not detain in
other cases? Unfortunately, traditional retributivism has not had
much to say in answer to this question.59 In fact, there are cases in
which non-punishment detention is clearly justified, even if we do not
have a theory to explain why. For example, there will be circum-
stances in which involuntary commitment and quarantine will be
plainly justified.
Furthermore, we should distinguish two ways in which the state
principles may govern personal decisions and the decisions of other organizations.
59 See NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STGMA 95 (1980):
The traditional retributivist, who asserts that the law enforcement system ought not to
take account of the harm which people might do, must either explain why it should be
subject to a restrictive principle which we do not apply outside the system, or else
argue that we should apply the same principle outside it.
For Walker's views on more recent versions of retributivism, see generaly Nigel Walker, Mod-
er Retributivism inJURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE EssAYs 73 (Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison,
eds., 1992).
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may respond to intentional violations of the law. It may imprison as
punishment for completed crimes, or it may restrain to prevent the
violation from being consummated. This latter power-which we may
call the power of "punitive restraint"-should be distinguished .from
preventive detention. Punitive restraint is justified by an ongoing at-
tempt to harm, while preventive detention means detention on
grounds of a generalized dangerousness to prevent crimes not pres-
ently intended or underway. Setting aside the question of preventive
detention for the moment, punitive restraint in the case of ongoing
efforts to break the law would seem to be as well justified as punish-
ment for past crimes. But to the extent that the state is permitted to
intervene to abort threatened crimes, the grounds for the restraint
cannot be the past commission of a crime. If the state could never
detain except for a crime committed, then the state could not inter-
vene to prevent an ongoing attempt to harm. It seems clear that in
some circumstances the state has the moral authority to do just that.60
Indeed, the power of the state to intervene to prevent crime is
more easily justified than the power to punish. Imprisonment for the
purpose of punishment lasts for more or less fixed periods of time.
Very few people still believe that keeping someone detained for such a
period can be justified on purely retributive grounds; at most retribu-
tion is a necessary but not sufficient condition for punishment. Sup-
pose, then, that the detainee ceases to be dangerous during the
period of his incarceration; how is his detention to be justified? All
that is left is deterrence, which is to say that he is being punished for
the effect his confinement will have on someone else. The fact of his
60 It is important to distinguish what I have called "punitive restraint" from pure pre-
ventive detention, though it is often thought of simply as a kind of preventive detention. I
cannot imagine a more basic right of the community than to use the instrument of the law
to restrain those who currently intend-in the strong sense of "intend" which imports the
beginning of an effort to harm-to commit a crime. The great perplexity caused by pre-
ventive detention lies in the fact that such preventive measures can be aimed at those who
do not currently intend harm but are nevertheless very dangerous because they are highly
likely to intend harm in the future. It is for this last function that I would like to reserve
the term "preventive detention." Punitive restraint is so-called because the present effort
to harm gives rise to a certain blameworthiness even if no harm has yet been caused:
blameworthiness, hence retribution, hence punitive. The criminal law, of course, has no
special category for instances of punitive restraint. It finds its way into the law of punish-
ment in the form of attempt provisions and stalker laws. But it also has its place in the
recognition that the police may interfere to prevent an attempt to murder. They need not
wait until the (unsuccessful) attempt is Lomplete to apprehend and charge with murder,
they may intervene to stop the attempt from being successful. It would be monstrous to
suppose that that were not so, in spite of our claim that the system allows free persons to
choose whether or not they will obey the law. Separating out punitive restraint from pre-
ventive detention, conceding that someone may be punitively restrained for as long as he
actively intends to harm another, and recognizing a certain grayness in the notion of "ac-
tively intending" sucessfully would lower the heat in the debate over preventive detention.
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crime, we say, gives us the right to use him as an example to prevent
others from doing the same thing. That rationale raises all sorts of
problems that we need not go into now-among other issues it raises
the question why only the state may do this and not some private indi-
vidual. But it should be clear that between holding someone to pre-
vent him from committing a crime that he is trying to commit, and
holding someone who has committed a crime in order to change the
behavior of other people, the first is at least as well justified as the
second-and probably better justified.
The point is: the state's power to detain cannot be limited to
cases in which a crime has been committed. Even one who rejects the
point about punitive restraint should admit that cases of commitment
and quarantine may be justified.61 On the other hand, even if you
accept that the state's power to detain goes beyond punishment, it
does not follow that you believe that preventive detention can bejusti-
fled, for cases of apparently acceptable detention are all relevantly dif-
ferent from preventive detention. Involuntary commitment involves
the insane, while preventive detention involves the sane. Quarantine
involves physical illness, while preventive detention does not. Punitive
restraint requires a present intention to harm, while preventive deten-
tion does not. It is to the moral justification of preventive detention,
therefore, that we turn now.
The issue is whether a state should have the power to preventively
detain, and if so, how should that power be limited. Preventive deten-
tion is detention not on the basis of past crimes but to prevent future
crimes, crimes which the dangerous person does not presently intend
to commit. It is detention of persons who are presumed sane but dan-
gerous. Their future crimes, if they commit them, will be committed
voluntarily and intentionally.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PREVENTIVE DETENTION
There are two arguments against preventive detention. The first
is that preventive detention depends upon accurate predictions of
dangerousness, and reliable predictions are, practically speaking, im-
possible-the notion of a predictable but voluntary action is incoher-
ent The second argument begins with the fact that preventive
detention restricts freedom, and argues that respect for human free-
dom prohibits such restriction except where the detained person has
committed a crime.
61 If you do not admit that such cases may be justified, you should be prepared to give
some explanation beyond the repetition of the dictum that no one may be detained except
for a past crime.
MICHAEL LOUIS CORRADO
A. PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS
1. The Reliability of Predictions
Among those who believe that preventive detention cannot be
justified, some, like Alan Dershowitz, hold that while it might bejusti-
fiable if predictions of dangerousness could be made with relative cer-
tainty, such predictions are by their very nature unreliable.62 It is of
course notoriously difficult to predict who will commit a violent crime.
Using current methods, the best estimate is that there would be at
least one "false positive" for every "true positive"; that is, we would
preventively detain at least one person who would never commit a
future crime for every person we detain correctly. 63 That rate of error
would seem to many to be unacceptably high; it is much higher, for
example, than the rate of error that we would find acceptable in con-
victing people of crimes.64
However, the advocate of preventive detention may argue that
since such persons are to be detained because of the risk they create,
it is wrong to speak of persons who are dangerous but would not in
fact commit a crime as wrongly detained. To speak in that way im-
ports notions of desert which are out of place in a discussion of pre-
ventive detention. Preventive detention incapacitates persons who
create a threat of harm. For each of the persons detained, there is a
one hundred percent chance that person presents a risk of haxn. 6 5
We do not wonder whether we are justified in keeping cars without
brakes off the road. We do not ask, for each such car, whether it
would in fact have caused an injury. In at least some cases it would
not. Keeping such cars off the road restricts human freedom, yet we
do not protest that such restrictions cannot be justified because pre-
diction is inaccurate. What is involved is not a prediction of future
62 See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23J.
LEGAL EDuc. 24 (1970). For a more recent and rather pessimistic assessment of our ability
to predict future violence, see Norval Morris, Keynote Address: Predators and Politics, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 517 (1992).
63 CHIN L TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 135-136 (1987);JFAN FLOUD & WARREN
YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINALJusTIcE 31, 180-202 (1981).
64 The comparison with the criminal justice system appears in many places, see, e.g.,
Stephen J. Morse, A Preferencefor Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Men-
tally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1982):
Inaccurate predictions create a powerful objection to involuntary commitment be-
cause a society with a strong preference for liberty should seek to minimize incorrect
involuntary commitments, even at the risk of increasing the number of "incorrect"
rejections of commitment. The analogue to the criminal justice system, of course, is
that our society does "not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as
equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty."
Id. at 75-76. (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 373 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
65 FLOUD & YOUNG, supra note 63, at 48-49.
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harm but an assessment of present dangerousness, and that the state
is justified in regulating dangerous behavior.
Even if we focus on the accuracy of predictions of future harm
rather than of assessments of dangerousness, the reality is that legisla-
tures and courts may be acting on the assumption that the accuracy of
prediction is much better than fifty percent. For example, the
Supreme Court of Washington in In re Young66 quoted with approval
an eighty percent accuracy figure for predictions of repeat sexual of-
fenses, 67 and the Washington legislature incorporated a finding that
such predictions were accurate in its sexual predator law.68 The point
is not that the court and the legislature are right; they may or may not
be. The point is that an argument that addresses only the difficulties
of prediction has nowhere to go in the face of these assertions. The
opponent of preventive detention will surely want to know whether an
objection can be made even if the predictions are accurate.
One argument that may be made in the face of such high esti-
mates is that even an accuracy level of eighty percent is not enough.
We require the same degree of accuracy to detain people for preven-
tive reasons that we require to imprison them for crimes. It is some-
times said that it is better that ten guilty persons should go free than
that one innocent one should be convicted, and if we took the analogy
literally it would mean that no one should be detained unless there is
better than a ninety percent chance that he has committed a crime in
the past, or that he will commit a crime in the future.
It is true that we require a high degree of assurance when punish-
ment is in the balance. But why should the same thing be true of
preventive detention? When the question is conviction for a past
crime, one harm already has been committed and cannot be changed
whatever the outcome of the judicial process. The only dangers are
those of convicting an innocent person, on the one side, of of letting a
guilty person off without his proper punishment. Convicting an inno-
cent person is clearly something to be avoided; the dangers of failing
to punish a guilty person do not weigh heavily against it. Since we do
not see the state as bearing any theological duty to maintain the eter-
nal balance of right and wrong, the most notable danger is that effec-
tive deterrence will be lessened. But that is only a marginal
consequence-we are not talking about letting everyone off, after all,
66 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
67 Id. at 1003-04.
68 RGW 71.09.010:
... The legislature further finds that sex offenders' likelihood of engaging in repeat
acts of predatory sexual violence is high.
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but only about making a mistake in a single case. 69
Consider that in the case of preventive detention there are other
harms-harms to those who will be injured if persons who will commit
crimes are released. If there is no deeper objection to preventive de-
tention than the inaccuracy of punishment, then we should be aware
that there is no reason to think of that inaccuracy as having the same
consequences as inaccuracy in conviction. If a group of ten can be
identified, six of whom will commit murder if allowed to go free-
though we do not know which of the ten they are-then, if we detain
them all, we perhaps wrongly detain four. But if we let them all go, six
people will die. If the only concern is the risk of "false positives," 70
then surely the likelihood that four will lose their freedom must be
weighed against the likelihood that six will lose their lives.
There are three conclusions to be drawn: first, the empirical evi-
dence concerning prediction is not conclusive. Those in favor of pre-
ventive detention will find either that present dangerousness is
enough or that predictions of future harm can now be made with
great accuracy. That is a practical consideration. Second, an analogy
to conviction, which requires an extremely high level of accuracy, is
not, and should not be, persuasive. This is a theoretical considera-
tion. Third, because of these considerations, the opponent of preven-
tive detention can no longer rest his case upon the unreliability of
predictions.
2. The Incoherence of Preventive Detention
Setting aside the problem of reliability, preventive detention can-
not be justified because the very notion is incoherent. Suppose that
violent behavior is in some cases perfectly predictable, and that there
are some persons who we can predict with absolute certainty will com-
mit serious violent crimes in the future; if they are not detained, they
will commit those crimes no matter what. Would not this be the best
case for preventive detention? But, if we know with certainty that
someone will commit a crime, then it would seem that the violent be-
havior itself is beyond the choice or control of the individual. We of
69 The fact that the guilty person who is released by mistake may be dangerous and
commit crimes in the future that he would not have committed had he been found guilty
and kept incapacitated for his prison term only serves to underline my point, however.
The concern in question is about the danger of allowing someone who will commit harm
in the future to run free. It is not about punishment for what he has done. That is, it is a
question about whether preventive detention is justified in the circumstances, and not
about whether punishment is justified.
70 If that is our only concern. I am not arguing in favor of unrestricted preventive
detention here; I am only arguing that the reliability of predictions is not an insurmounta-
ble problem for its advocates.
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course do not blame someone whose harmful behavior is beyond his
control. Because the notion of preventive detention is the notion of
detention of sane human beings whose future harmful behavior will
be voluntary, there cannot, for purely conceptual reasons, be any such
thing as preventive detention. Instead, all forms of detention of pre-
dictably dangerous persons would be involuntary commitment of
those whose dangerous behavior is beyond their control. Those
whose actions remain within their control cannot be preventively de-
tained; those whose future harmful behavior can be predicted are in-
sane and may be involuntarily committed.
This argument, which has raised its head every time I have
opened up a classroom discussion of preventive detention, involves
some extraordinarily subtle philosophical points. It is implicit in cer-
tain arguments for abolishing the insanity defense. For example,
Norval Morris argues that if the insane have an excuse, then so should
those from rotten social backgrounds because there is a higher corre-
lation between social adversity and crime than between insanity and
crime. The implication is that.where crime is predictable, it is to that
extent unfree.71 This problem-also resembles the theological struggle
with the concept of divine foreknowledge. In its simplest form, this
concept entails the following syllogism:
1. For each action that we perform, God knew in advance that we
would perform that action.
2. If God knows that something will occur, then that thing can-
not fail to occur.
3. Therefore for each action that we perform, that action could
not fail to occur.
Therefore we have no real choice in our actions; each action we
perform must be performed. And the theological quandary leaves us
with this dilemma: either God is not all-knowing, or we cannot be
blamed for our actions. 72
71 NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw, 63 (1982). Even if the implication
is mistaken, there may be other reasons for taking into account the effect of social back-
ground on crime. See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of CriminalLaw, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385
(1976); Richard Delgado, Rotten Social Background, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY 9 (1985). But see
Stephen Morse, The Twilight of Welfare CQiminology, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247 (1976). All three
are reprinted in MICHAEL CORRADO, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAw
(1994).
72 Saint Augustine finds this dilemma in the writings of Cicero:
[T]o confess that God exists, and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge
of future things, is the most manifest folly. This Cicero himself saw .... However, in
his book on divination, he in his own person most openly opposes the doctrine of
prescience of future things. But all this he seems to do in order that he may not grant
the doctrine of fate, and by so doing destroy free will. For he thinks that, the knowl-
edge of future things being once conceded, fate follows as so necessary a consequence
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a. The Argument From Conceptual Modalities
In fact the problem does not depend upon God's existence or
omniscience. The problem can be reconstructed without any men-
tion of God's knowledge. If we look at the stripped-down version of
the argument we will be in a better position to see what it involves:
1. For each action that we perform, it was true in advance that we
would perform that action.
2. If it is true at time tl that something will occur at time t2, then
that thing cannot fail to occur at time t2.
3. Therefore for each action that we perform, that action could
not fail to occur.
Thus, if I raise my arm now, it was true yesterday that I would
raise my arm now. But if it was true yesterday that I would raise my
arm now, it is impossible that I not raise my arm now, for it is incon-
ceivable that it could have been true yesterday that I would raise my
arm now unless I actually raise my arm now. Thus from the fact that it
was true yesterday that I would raise my arm now it follows that it is
impossible for me not to raise my arm now. Furthermore, if someone
could have predicted with certainty yesterday that I would raise my
arm now it must have been true yesterday that I would raise my arm
now, and it would seem to follow from the predictability of my raising
my arm that I cannot do otherwise. I have to raise my arm. If this
argument is correct, then the predictably dangerous cannot help do-
ing what they do; but, of course, neither can anyone else.
Some have rejected the first premise, arguing that it is not true
that we will perform an action until the time at which we perform it;
"John will call home" is not either true or false in advance of John's
calling home. Since John is free to decide one way or the other, the
prediction has no truth value in advance. 73 That response seems inad-
that it cannot be denied.
ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 152-153 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950).
73 See, e.g., Aristotle, De Interpretatione, chapter 9:
In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or
negative, must be true or false .... [But] when... it relates to the future, the case is
altered. For if all propositions whether positive or negative are either true or false,
then .. .if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and
another denies it, it is plain that the statement of one will correspond with reality and
the other will not .... Now if this be so, nothing is or takes place fortuitously, either
in the present or in the future, and there are no real alternatives; everything takes
place of necessity and is fixed.
BAsIc WoRSs 45-46 (Richard McKeon trans., 1941). See also Elizabeth Anscombe, Aristotle
and the Sea Battle, 65 MIND 1 (1956). Arthur Prior called the argument in question "the
Master Argument of Diodorus." Arthur N. Prior, Topology of Time, in PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 32 (1967). If I am not mistaken, something like this is one of the central doctrines
of the philosophy of mathematics known as intuitionism. See WILUAM & MARTHA KNEALE,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC 672-681 (1962); STEPHAN KOERNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATH-
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equate. I may not know in advance whether or not John will call
home, but he will have to take one action or the other.74 If he does
call, then it is true now that he will, even though I do not now know it.
If he does not call, then it is false now that he will. If I have a bet with
someone-I say thatJohn will and she says thatJohn won't-then one
of us is right and one of us is wrong, although we will not know who
until the time comes.
It is easier to find a problem in the second premise. The premise
is that if something is going to occur, then it cannot not occur-i.e., it
must occur. This is ambiguous, but it is precisely the ambiguity that
drives the argument. To see the two possible meanings, let us recon-
struct it using an explicit modal operator "it cannot be the case that."
We might understand the second premise to mean this:
A. If it is true at tl that Xwill occur at t2, then it cannot be the
case that X does not occur at t2.
Or we might understand it to mean this:
B. It cannot be the case both that it is true at t1 that Xwill occur
at t2, and that X does not occur at t2.
The difference between them is a matter of scope. In A, the mo-
dal operator governs only the last clause; in B, it governs the entire
sentence. The difference is significant, for one of these propositions
is true, but makes the argument invalid. The other makes the argu-
ment valid, but is false. 75
To see the difference it helps to think in terns of possible worlds.
To say that a proposition cannot be the case is to say that it is not true
in any possible world. What A says, then, is that if it happens to actu-
ally be the case, in the real world, that it is true at tl that Xwill occur
at t2, then it is not false in any world-more simply, it is true in every
EmrA-cs 131-144 (1960).
74 This move, or rather its mathematical counterpart, is one of the moves rejected by
the intuitionist: if I cannot prove A and I cannot prove B, then I cannot assert <A or B>.
Indeed, if I cannot either prove or disprove A, then I cannot assert <A or not-A>.
75 Here is a classroom example that illustrates the sort of ambiguity involved: Get the
class to concede that there is no logical contradiction in believing that there is an elephant
in the classroom; if there were a logical contradiction, then it would be a logical truth that
there is no elephant, and of course that is not so. Then get the class to concede that if
someone believes that there is no elephant in a certain place, it is logically contradictory
for him to believe that there is an elephant there. By a simple application of modus tol/ens
(not-Q, if P then Q, therefore not-P), those premises would seem to entail that the class
does not believe that there is no elephant in the classroom. Although no one is inclined to
be deceived by the argument, it is often difficult for a listener to put her finger on the
problem. The problem, of course, is the second premise: If what it says is that it is logically
contradictory to believe that there is and is not an elephant in the room at one and the
same time, then it is true, but the argument is invalid. If what it says is that if there in no
elephant in the room then it is logically impossible for there to be one, the argument is
valid. But the premise is false.
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possible world-that X occurs at t2. And if that were the case, then
the argument would be valid. From the fact that someone's behavior
is predictable, it would follow that he could not do otherwise. This
interpretation, however, is implausible. If it were a correct construc-
tion of the second premise, then every proposition that is true would,
as a matter of logic, be necessarily true-that is, true in every logically
possible world. Although that interpretation would make the argu-
ment valid, it surely is not a plausible reading of the second premise.
On the other hand, B is a plausible reading. Option B says that
there is no possible world in which it is true on one hand that X will
occur at a certain time, and on the other hand, Xwill not. It expresses
the inconsistency of supposing the prediction to be true though the
predicted event never comes to pass. But although that is a plausible
reading of the second premise of the argument, it does not support
the inference. The conclusion of the contested inference is that no
action could fail to occur, and that every action that occurs occurs in
every possible world. To reach this conclusion from the premise that
it is true in advance that actions that do occur will occur, the reason-
ing has to include that the action occurs and that the action will occur
in every possible world in which such is true in advance.
To make the problem a little more concrete, assume that these
two things are true: that the North won the American Civil War and
the South could have won it (the outcome of a war depending upon
decisions made under conditions of uncertainty). It would seem to be
true, in some sense or other, that if someone won the war then they
could not (also) have failed to win it. Following this line of argument,
that the North won the war leads to the argument that the North
could not have failed to win. But we have assumed that the South
could have won, so it must also be true that the North might not have
won. An apparent paradox: the North could not have lost the war,
and yet it could have.
The answer to the riddle is that one of the propositions is ambig-
uous-the one that says that if someone won the war then they could
not (also) have failed to win it. If it means that whoever won the war
won it in every possible world, then the paradoxical inference goes
through. But that reading of the premise is implausible. What gives
the proposition whatever plausibility it has is the fact that it is inconsis-
tent to suppose both that someone won the war and that they did not
win it. That fact does not make anyone the necessary victor.
What is at issue here is the following argument form: from the
truth of some proposition P, and the truth of the proposition <if P
then necessarily Q>, to infer the necessity of Q What I have argued so
far is that ordinarily the second premise will be true only if it expresses
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the necessity of the connection between P and Q and not a condi-
tional resulting in the necessity of Q all by itself. But the necessary
connection between P and Q does not warrant the inference from the
truth of P to the necessity of Q. Thus, the necessary connection be-
tween the accuracy of a prediction that an action will occur and the
occurrence of the action does not warrant the inference from the ac-
curacy of the prediction that an action will occur to the unavoidability
of the action. The conceptual argument, therefore, does not show
that a predictable action cannot be voluntary.
b. The Argument From Temporal Modalities
There is, however, another move that could be made here. Re-
turn to the formal version of the argument just mentioned. I argued
that from the simple truth of P the necessity of Q does not follow; in
other words, from the predictability of an action the unavoidability of
the action does not follow. The proponent of the argument might
insist that more is at issue than the simple truth of P. He might argue
that P itself is, in an important sense, a necessary truth. And if P is
necessary, and <if P then Q> is necessary, then we are warranted in
drawing the conclusion that Q is necessary. For if P is true in every
possible world, and <if P then Q> is true in every possible world, then
Q must also be true in every possible world.
In the case that concerns us, the first premise will involve proposi-
tions like this: it is true in advance that John will call home. We can-
not claim that such propositions are true in every logically possible
world, or even in every physically possible world. They are, however,
propositions about a time that is past with respect to the time at which
John will call home. At any given time it is necessarily true that it is
out of our power to change the truth value of any proposition about
the past. Thus, for every point in time in every possible world, this
much is true: every world accessible through human action from that
point in time in that world will contain all of the true propositions
about past times that are contained in that world.
Making use of the different modal operator "it is out of John's
power to bring it about that," we have the following valid (and appar-
ently sound) version of the argument.76 Suppose that in fact John
does call home at time t2, then it was true the day before (time tl)
that he would call home the next day. This is a fact that he cannot
change at t2; he cannot go back in time and turn something that was
true yesterday into something that was false yesterday. And so:
76 Compare the discussion of the "power necessity" operator in JOHN MARTIN FiSCHER,
METAPHYSiCS OF FREE WIL 8 (1994).
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1. It is out of John's hands at t2 to make it false at tl that he would
call home the next day.
2. It is out ofJohn's hands (being a logical truth) that if it was true at
tl that he would do X at t2, then he does X at t2.,
Hence, it is out ofJohn's hands to make it false at t2 that he calls
home.
At a given time everything is out of John's hands except what he
can affect at that time. What was true yesterday is out of his hands;
hence, it is a part of every possible world accessible from him at this
point. What is logically true is also true in every such world. But then
the conclusion follows.
A lot of thought has been given to this puzzle and it is not one to
be dismissed lightly. For our purposes, however, the solution is not
complex: the first premise is false. It is not out of John's hands to
make the earlier truth false. He can refuse to call home at t2; and if
he refuses to call home at t2, it would have been false at tl that he was
going to call home at t2. It is simply misleading to suppose that all of
the possible worlds accessible by a human being from a given point in
time must include the truth of all of the true predictions about the
future. For if they do, then of course there is only one world that is
accessible from any point in time.77 We must distinguish between pre-
dictive propositions and other sorts of propositions that might have
been true in the past. Worlds accessible from a certain point in time
must contain all truths about what has happened up to that point in
time; but they must be allowed to differ as to their predictive proposi-
tions. If we look at things in that way, then it does not follow from the
fact that I cannot change the past that predictability is inconsistent
with voluntariness.
c. The Argument from Epistemic Warrant
The argument might be revived in another way, but I believe that
can also be shown to be misleading. In that form, the argument
77 Suppose that at a certain point in time I have two choices open to me, to do A or to
do B. Then I have it in my power to make actual one of the set of worlds containing A, or
the set of worlds containing B. Each of the worlds in those two sets will contain the history
of the actual world up to the moment at which I make the decision. If the "history" of the
world contains not only all the truths about what has occurred, but also all the truths about
the future, then my choice is an illusory one. For if I end up choosing A, then it was true
before I chose it that I would choose A, and that truth would be a part of every possible
world I could reach from the point at which I made the choice-in other words, there is
only one possible world I could reach. The solution I suggest in the text is that the "his-
tory" of the world must be understood, for purposes of possible-worlds talk, not to include
propositions about the future. See the discussion of "hard" and "soft" facts of various sorts
in Fischer. Id. at 111-130; Alvin Plantinga, On Ockham's Way Out, 3 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
235 (1986).
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would begin with the premise that we could know in advance that
someone was going to behave violently in the future. The argument
would include the premise that knowledge is at least a warranted be-
lief, and that to be warranted, a belief about future behavior would
have to based upon sufficient causal conditions of the action pre-
dicted. If the premise were so, then since the only way we could know
that someone would do something in the future is to know the causal
conditions and their sufficiency for the future action, to avoid the ac-
tion would be beyond the agent's control.78 For if causally sufficient
conditions for an event occur, then the event will occur; and if such
conditions occur it will be beyond any agent's power to prevent the
consequences of those conditions-including his own caused ac-
tions-from occurring. The argument concludes, therefore, that pre-
dictable actions are not voluntary.
The problem with the argument is that it assumes that sound pre-
dictions are possible only if the causal antecedents of behavior are
known. If this were. so, then it would be true that prediction is possi-
ble only if the agent is not responsible for what he does, and the no-
tion of preventive detention does not make sense. But it does not
appear to be so. We make predictions all of the time that are highly
likely to be correct, yet which (unless we have settled the question in
favor of determinism in some other way) must be assumed to be con-
sistent with the predicted behavior being spontaneous. It is a good
bet that if nothing arises to give me a reason not to go home at the
end of the work day, I will go home. However, I could do otherwise.
To borrow an example whose origin now eludes me, you may swear
that you are not going to answer the phone for the next hour, but I
predict that if your spouse rushes into the room saying that your child
has been in an accident and that the hospital is going to call you to get
you insurance number, you will answer when the phone rings. I am
certain of it. But I am not aware of any causal antecedents of your
behavior, and indeed I assume that you answer the phone freely. You
could do otherwise. The fact that you are certain not to do otherwise
does not mean that you have been caused to do as you do, and it does
78 What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it
was this-that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order
in which they have been foreknown; ... and if a certain order of things, then a certain
order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient cause
.... But if this be so, then there is nothing in our own power, and there is no such
thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human
life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings,
exhortations had recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of
rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked. And that consequences so
disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to
reject the foreknowledge of future things.
AucusrrNE, supra note 72, at 153.
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not mean that you could not do otherwise, unless we assume the very
conclusion in question.79
My conclusion is that (allowing as always that determinism may
be true, or that if it is not, it may still be true that all actions are
caused) there is evidently nothing in the notion of prediction all by
itself which makes it inconsistent to suppose that predictable actions
can nevertheless be free.
B. RESPECT FOR RIGHTS
Given that predictability does not present a problem one way or
the other, we must ask whether there are other reasons for rejecting
preventive detention, reasons that come into play even if the predic-
tion of dangerousness could be made more accurate. Is there some
reason why we should not preventively detain even the one who will
certainly commit a dangerous act in the future, let alone the one who
will not?
1. The Right To Be Free
One who believes that preventive detention could not be justified
even if predictions were perfectly accurate is Andrew von Hirsch.80
Von Hirsch bases his rejection of preventive detention upon the high
value we place upon human freedom: since preventive detention in-
terferes with human freedom and with our ability to choose how we
will live our lives, and since it deprives people of freedom for reasons
they have no control over and cannot choose to change, he finds it
morally unacceptable. "[S] uch a scheme would entail undue sacrifice
79 Of course if we accept compatibilism, the doctrine that freedom of action is compati-
ble with the causation of action, actions will not turn out to be unfreejust because they are
caused, in any case. See Richard M. Hare, Prediction and Moral Responsibility, in EssAYs ON
BIOETHICS 195 (1993):
[T] here are actions which we should all think we could predict and be right in think-
ing this, and about which, nevertheless, we also think it right to make moral judg-
ments .... [Ml ost of the philosophers of any penetration who have discussed this
problem have been trying to find a way of saying that human actions are, in principle,
both predictable and morally responsible.
See also Michael Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law? 142 U. PA L. REv.
1529, 1546-60 (1994) (discussing compatibilism) and Michael Corrado, Automatism and the
Theory of Action, 39 EMORY L.J. 1191, 1201-09 (1990) (same).
80 Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Con-
victed Persons, 21 Bur. L. REV. 717 (1972). See also B.H. Baumrin, Preventive Detention, 19
WAYNE L. REv. 1067, 1074 (1973):
[Tihe solution proposed by the District of Columbia [in adopting the new pretrial
detention rule for dangerous offenders] is to detain them and thus prevent their
crimes. To arrest a social epidemic three of the fundamental cornerstones of Anglo-
American jurisprudence are to be sacrificed... [:] the criminal conduct requirement,
the presumption of innocence, and the right to liberty.
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of individual freedom and dignity."
8
'
Do we in fact value individual choice so highly? The evidence
that we do, according to von Hirsch, is that we do not incarcerate
people until they have made a choice to break the law:
[T] he choice-whether to engage in such conduct and chance the pun-
ishment-is left up to the individual; the state will not intervene unless
he is found to have violated the law. By giving him that choice, society
risks that the individual will make the wrong selection, to the commu-
nity's detriment ..... Nevertheless, we choose to withhold the coercive
power of the law until after the event. In so doing, we may incur the
costs of certain anti-social conduct that might have been precluded by
state preventive action. But that is felt to be well worth the assurance
given to individual freedom.82
But we do not, in fact, withhold the coercive power of the law until
after the choice has been made; more and more the community in-
sists on putting dangerous people away to prevent crimes not yet com-
mitted. The argument must therefore be intended to show that we
should withhold detention until the law has been broken. The argu-
ment comes to this: since we value individual choice highly, we should
withhold detention until a crime has been committed; it is well worth
the risk.
The problem is that the major premise in this argument might
support an entirely different conclusion. If our respect for freedom
entails the moral imperative to increase the amount of freedom in the
world-a kind of consequentialism of freedom-then preventive de-
tention might be morally acceptable. It might be that, by preventing
crime, preventive detention would increase the future amount of free-
dom in the world (measured, perhaps, in terms of actual alternatives
available to individuals83), and would increase it over every alternative
available to the state.
If our respect for freedom means that the state may not interfere
with existing freedoms, regardless of the consequences, then it may
indeed conflict with preventive detention. But the extent to which we
should protect existing freedom is clearly limited: we permit the state
to tax, to jail convicted criminals, to educate children compulsorily,
and to force people to serve in the military. For many of these things
we think the good to be accomplished justifies the deprivation of free-
dom. What the argument lacks is some reason for thinking that pre-
ventive detention is different from these things. The burden, of
course, ought to be on the other side; those who favor preventive de-
81 Von Hirsch, supra note 80, at 747.
82 Id. at 746-747.
83 See Amartya Sen, Justice: Means versus Freedoms, 19 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1
passim (1990).
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tention ought to have to show why it is acceptable. But it is clear that
the argument from the value of human freedom gives no reason to
think that such a demonstration would be impossible.
2. The Right to Be Held Harmless
Floud and Young have raised a different sort of argument.84 To
understand their position, it is necessary to know that in 1979 Ferdi-
nand Schoeman argued that universal preventive detention-deten-
tion of any dangerous person regardless of whether they had
committed a crime in the past or not-was not more objectionable in
theory than the practice of quarantine.85 Although Floud and Young
accept the possibility of preventive detention for those who are dan-
gerous and have been convicted of a crime, they argue that there is a
"right to be presumed harmless" that protects those who have never
committed a crime, no matter how likely they are to commit a crime
in the future.
The crucial objection is that such measures would entail abrogating the
right to be presumed harmless which, like the right to be presumed in-
nocent, is fundamental to a free society.8 6
This right to be presumed harmless does not extend to those who
have been convicted of a crime because convicted offenders, through
their culpability, have lost that right. They can be detained beyond a
normal sentence in order to prevent future crimes, if along with their
conviction for a past crime they can be proved to be dangerous.
The prior crime serves in part as evidence of dangerousness; but
if it were only that, then any good evidence of future dangerousness
should overcome the presumption, even without a prior crime. The
additional factor introduced by the prior crime is culpability, which is
a necessary condition of preventive detention and serves to distin-
guish dangerous offenders who may be preventively detained from
dangerous non-offenders who may not. Unlike quarantine, preven-
tive detention is an imputation of future intentional misbehavior; this,
they argue, is a distinction that Schoeman missed. To accuse some-
one of future intentional misbehavior we need more than the likeli-
hood of such misbehavior. Culpability for past crimes is the key:
The notion of culpability seems to be indispensable [to explain why pre-
ventive detention of those convicted of past crimes is acceptable while
universal preventive detention of the dangerous is not] .... [P]eople
do not simply expect or hope to be treated as harmless; they have a right
to be so treated, even if it is more probable than not that they do intend
8 4 JEAN E. FLOUD & WARREN YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (1981).
85 Ferdinand Schoeman, On Incapacitating the Dangerous, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 27 (1979).
86 FLOUD & YOUNG, supra note 84, at 44.
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harm;just as they have a right to be treated as innocent even if it is more
probable than not that they are guilty ..... [I]n the end, only wrongful
actions can lead to just forfeiture of these rights, as is well understood in
respect of the presumption of innocence.87
Floud and Young do not have much to say about the presumption of
harmlessness except that it blocks universal preventive detention and
is lost when a violent crime is committed. Indeed, it seems to be no
more than a statement of the conclusion: no one may be preventively
detained unless they have already committed a crime. In particular,
there is no good explanation of why the presumption of harmlessness
may not be defeated by evidence of dangerousness without evidence
of a prior crime. It is true that the presumption of innocence may only
be defeated by evidence of culpability; but that is because the pre-
sumption of innocence is a presumption of non-culpability. There is
no similar logical connection between a presumption of harmlessness
and culpability, and no good reason why mere evidence of future dan-
gerousness would not be enough to overcome such a presumption.
Of course, it could be that without a prior crime no other evi-
dence of dangerousness is reliable enough; but that takes us back to
the doubtful empirical argument based upon reliability. We are look-
ing for firmer ground on which to stand, and neither respect for
human freedom nor the "presumption of harmlessness" seems to pro-
vide that ground. Of course, if we were relatively sure of our conclu-
sion-that universal preventive detention is never acceptable, but
preventive detention of offenders sometimes is-then some such prin-
ciple might be invoked to explain it. But that is not the position we
are contemplating; we are simply trying to understand whether, and
to what extent, preventive detention may be acceptable.
IV. PREVENTrvE DETENTION AS PUNISHMENT
Though no persuasive argument against preventive detention has
been proposed, there has not been one in favor of it either-a rather
surprising fact, given the growing significance of the practice. Per-
haps the only important argument in its favor is one advanced to show
that preventive detention and quarantine can be reduced to punish-
ment, and that a retributive justification of each can be given.88 A
close examination of this argument will aid us in understanding the
true role of human freedom in limiting the state's right to detain.8 9
87 Id. at 43-44.
88 See Michael Davis, Arresting the White Death, 94 APA NEWSLETrERs (Law and Medicine)
92 (Spring 1995); Stephen Morse, Responsibility, Blame and Danger An Essay on Preventive
Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113 (1996).




Let us begin with the assumption that Jones is a very dangerous
man, and that we have been able to predict, with a great deal of confi-
dence, thatJones will cause harm to another. Perhaps we can predict
that, under ordinary stress, he is capable of maiming or killing the
people around him, that he is very likely to come under stress, and, as
a consequence, that he is likely to harm those around him. And let us
assume that there is no way to prevent this harm except by detaining
Jones right now. Because we respect his right to be free to make
choices, we do not detain him. Instead, we approach him with this
information: "You are a very dangerous person and if not restrained
right now you are likely to cause serious harm. If you like we can show
you the evidence we have for this; you will find it very persuasive. We
offer you the opportunity to detain yourself now in a specially
equipped detention facility. We must tell you, however, that if you
refuse to detain yourself you will be breaking a law-the law against
reckless endangerment-and we will have to imprison you. Make
your choice."90
As I understand the argument, it supposes that we are morally
justified in presenting the dangerous person with this choice and be-
cause of this justification, the dangerous person has no right to re-
main free; therefore, simple preventive detention does not conflict
with any rights of the dangerous person. Either he has consented, or
we are entitled to punish him for reckless endangerment; we may de-
tain him either way. He has therefore no right to be free, and conse-
quently it is morally acceptable for us to detain him without giving
Michael Corrado, Punishment, Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, CRiMINALJuSTmcE ETHICS
(forthcoming 1996).
90 Here is how Davis sets up the argument
A dangerous person who, being informed of his condition, refused (civil) detention
would, all else equal, fail to exercise the care a reasonable person would exercise in
the circumstances. He would be deviating from the standard of reasonable care at
least as grossly as would someone with contagious tuberculosis who refused (civil) con-
finement for treatment when nothing else would protect the public .... The alterna-
tive to detention is the moral equivalent of letting someone, without adequate
justification, walk crowded streets with a large bomb that could go off at any moment.
Imprisonment for reckless endangerment is a way of preventing the harmful conduct
that mere gross recklessness risks. It is, in effect, (criminal) preventive detention. But
it is more than that; it is just punishment.
DAvis, supra note 88, at 95. Morse says this:
Here are the elements of the new crime: 1) conviction of at least one serious crime of
violence, or at least one occurrence of involuntary civil commitment for serious dan-
gerous behavior; 2) conscious awareness of an extremely high risk that the defendant
will in the immediate future cause substantial unjustified harm; and 3) failure to com-
mit oneself voluntarily or to take other reasonably effective steps to avoid causing fu-
ture harm. The crime is complete when the agent recklessly fails to take the steps
reasonably necessary to avoid harmdoing.
MORSE, supra note 88, at 152.
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him the choice. The only question is whether it is less onerous for
him to be placed in prison or in the special detention facilities; per-
haps we must leave it to him to choose. 91 The punishment set for the
crime of reckless endangerment would be of an appropriate and lim-
ited duration; we do not have to assume it would be for an indefinite
period of time. But, of course, each time Jones is released he may be
reexamined to see whether he remains dangerous. If he does, he may
be presented with the same two choices.92
We should find the argument troubling. If it is sound, then we
may imprison him for the crime of dangerousness, a conclusion that
would appear to be inconsistent with strongly held beliefs about the
nature of the criminal law. And yet if there is a flaw in the argument,
it is not obvious. Certainly someone wielding a dangerous or defective
instrument in public, endangering the lives of those around him in
unjustifiable ways, can be made to stop under threat of punishment-
a limitation upon his freedom. Why cannot a dangerous person who
is himself a threat to others be made to give up all of his freedom
under threat of punishment, assuming that the increase in the welfare
of those around him outweighs the lessening of his own?
The plausibility of the argument thus depends, in part, on the
reliability of the analogy to the person with a dangerous physical in-
strument. If there is no way to make an instrument safe to use, then
the owner may be required to keep it out of commission; if he refuses,
he may be jailed-repeatedly, if he continues to refuse. In the same
way, the dangerous person may be required to keep himself out of
commission. But the argument does not depend entirely upon the
analogy with dangerous instruments. A person who is likely to cause
trouble if he enters another person's house may be required to stay
91 In speaking of quarantine, which he compares to preventive detention in this regard,
Davis says:
If... the police power provides no decisive reason for government to prefer civil
confinement over criminal punishment, the choice between them should be left to
the contagious person himself. He can, in other words, justifiably be confined for
treatment only if he accepts such confinement. The contagious person can be con-
fined for treatment only if he waives his right to be punished for reckless endanger-
ment. The justification of civil confinement for treatment thus seems to leave the
right to punishment intact, indeed, to be its conceptual twin.
DAvIs, supra note 88, at 95.
92 The term of imprisonment should be relatively short, but at the end of each term,
a still-dangerous convict would be exposed to criminal liability again unless he or she
took the appropriate steps.
MORSE, supra note 88, at 152.
So, if you refuse civil confinement, we could justifiably jail you for a significant term
for reckless endangerment. And if you hive not successfully completed treatment by
the end of your jail term, we could justifiably rearrest you as soon as you walked out,
recharge you, and even deny you bail.
DAvis, supra note 88, at 94.
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out of that house under threat of imprisonment. The only difference
between preventive detention and a restraining order is that preven-
tive detention proposes not that the dangerous person stay out of a
certain confined space, but that he stay within a certain confined
space.
This difference is significant, however. In the case of the danger-
ous instrument and in the case of the restraining order, the issue is a
limitation upon an actor's freedom. In neither case, however, is there
a serious restriction upon the exercise of the actor's rights. Using a
dangerous instrument unreasonably puts others in danger, for one
thing, and no one can insist upon his right to do that in the absence
of some independent justification. Exclusion from someone else's
property is likewise not a denial of anything the actor has a right to-
particularly if his only reason for being there would be to harm an-
other. In neither of these cases is there any serious question about
denying significant freedoms to which the actor is entitled.93 On the
other hand, if he is confined to an institution, he is deprived of the
opportunity to do many things he normally would have the right to
do-to walk down Main Street, to buy ice cream in his favorite store,
to visit a friend, to live with his family. This is a very considerable loss
to him, and it is not the same as depriving him of the right to be in
someone else's house, or of the right to use a defective and dangerous
vehicle. If the argument is sound, therefore, it will justify an extensive
encroachment upon the freedom of the dangerous person.
A statute criminalizing reckless endangerment might read like
the following:
Any person who acts in conscious disregard of a substantial and unjusti-
fied risk that his action will cause physical harm to others is guilty of
reckless endangerment. 94
93 Recent innovations like the "stalking" statutes may raise questions like those raised by
preventive detention if in fact they deprive the actor of the right to move about as he likes
for legitimate reasons.
94 The Model Penal Code has the following provisions:
Section 211.2. Recklessly Endangering Another Person.
A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which
places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Reck-
lessness and danger shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm at
or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be
loaded.
Section 1.18. General Definitions.
(5) "Conduct" means an action or an omission and its accompanying state of mind
Section 2.02. General Requirements of Liability.
(2) (c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
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Assuming, for the sake of argument, that such a provision could be
morally justified, the question is whether it would authorize punish-
ment of dangerous persons who refused to detain themselves. 95 It
would, certainly, permit us to punish someone who, without justifica-
tion, used a defective or dangerous instrument knowing that he cre-
ated a serious risk to others in doing so. On these grounds, for
example, the use of a dangerously defective vehicle could be
prohibited.
It would also permit us to punish someone who knowingly en-
gaged in conduct that endangered others. To drive recklessly is to
endanger others, and it may be punished under the statute. To drive
after having taken a sedative also endangers others. There is nothing
material element exists or will result from his conduct.
Section 2.01 ... ; Omission as Basis of Liability.
(3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unac-
companied by an action unless:
(a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or
(b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.
Much of what follows in this paper will be a search for a duty that will make a failure to
detain oneself a crime under the reckless endangerment statute. The MPG provides that a
duty turning an omission into criminalizable conduct may be expressly created by the law,
either in the statute involving the conduct in question, or elsewhere. We must keep in
mind, however, that the problem for us is to find a legal duty that is morally justifiable.
The law might, for example, create the duty for innocent and non-dangerous parties to
detain themselves for the common good. A 1930s penal law in the Soviet Union punished
family members of army deserters, whether or not they were aware of the desertion. Such
a law would not generally be considered to be morally justifiable except under the most
extreme conditions, if even then. By the same token a law creating a duty on the part of
family members to detain themselves when a desertion occurred would not be justifiable
either.
95 There is a problem, of course, about how to understand the requirement that he
must be aware of his dangerousness. IfJones does not believe that he is dangerous, in spite
of what we tell him, then he cannot be said to be aware that he is dangerous. The whole
scenario on which the argument is predicated seems to require that there be a test for
dangerous that is reliable and known to be reliable. But beyond that it requires thatJones
be persuaded by the results of the test A test that is known to be reliable is something that
a reasonable person ought to believe generally, but that is not enough to catch Jones
under the statute if he does not actually believe it. Even if we were to change the statute, of
course, to make negligence sufficient for liability-"where a reasonable person would have
been aware"-there is no guarantee that the statute would catch Jones. For even in the
presence of very persuasive external evidenceJones may be justified in not believing in his
own dangerousness. If he has the evidence (however mistaken in the end) of his own
determination not to harm anyone, then it may be reasonable for him not to believe the
external evidence, however powerful it may seem to others. This is, I think, a serious prob-
lem for the argument, but it is one I prefer to disregard in this discussion. To reject the
argument on this basis would be to allow the possibility that it would be proper to detain
someone who did, as a matter of fact, accept his own dangerousness, and that is the more
interesting issue. We may qualify the conclusion accordingly: IfJones can be persuaded of




else the person who has taken a sedative must do to raise a threat
other than beginning to drive. In each of these cases the actor will
have done something that causes others to be in danger-whether
using a dangerous instrument, or driving recklessly, or driving under
the influence of a sedative-he is therefore blameworthy and may be
punished for it.
The merely dangerous person, on the other hand, is not doing
anything that causes others to be in danger, unless it is his failing to
detain himself. But his failing to detain himself will be unjustified
only if he has an obligation to detain himself, and unless we find such
an obligation his behavior does not fall under the reckless endanger-
ment statute. It is difficult to see how such an obligation could arise.
It cannot be derived, for example, from the fact that if he does not
detain himself he will be recklessly endangering others, for that is the
very thing we are trying to prove. There must be some other reason
for thinking that he has an obligation to detain himself or, to put it
another way, for thinking that his failure to detain himself is
unjustified.
If he is allowed to remain free and harms someone in the future,
that harm will be unjustified, of course; otherwise he would not be
dangerous. One who is likely to harm others, but only when it isjusti-
fied, is not a threat to the community; he is doing what he ought to
do. The danger of the dangerous person lies in the fact that he will
cause unjustified harm. The question, therefore, is whether, from the
fact that his future violence will be unjustified, we may conclude that
his failure to detain himself is also unjustified.
If we could argue, from the prediction of unjustified harm, that
he is obligated to do whatever is required to prevent that harm, and
could also argue that there is no less onerous way of preventing it than
to detain himself, then it might follow that his failure to detain him-
self was also unjustified. But neither of those conditions appears to be
true. Consider first whether the likelihood of a future violation of an
obligation should translate into a present obligation to do whatever is
necessary to prevent that violation. It is perfectly clear that deontic
logic alone will not support such an inference. Suppose that I have
two debts of equal size, both due tomorrow and suppose that,
although I had enough money to repay both, I have foolishly squan-
dered some of it so that I have only enough money left to repay one.
If the prospect of violating an obligation meant that I incur the deriva-
tive obligation to do whatever is necessary to prevent the violation,
then I am not permitted to repay either loan. For if I repay either, I
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will not be able to repay the other.96
The obligation of the dangerous person to do whatever is neces-
sary to prevent his future harmful actions cannot be derived simply as
a matter of logic from the possibility of future unjustified harm. That
does not mean, of course, that there is no such obligation, only that it
does not follow as a matter of logic from the future harm. If there is a
way to demonstrate the existence of the obligation, however, the bur-
den would seem to be upon those who would advance the argument
to tell us what it is.
Even if such a derivation were possible-this seems to be the crux
of the matter-it would not be the end of the matter. The obligation
of the dangerous person to do whatever is necessary would not entail
the obligation to detain himself; where preventive detention is in
question, there is always a less onerous way to achieve the same result.
The harm to be prevented is harm that the dangerous person will
freely choose to bring about, and therefore he may prevent it simply
by refraining from doing it. He need not detain himself now because
the simpler and more direct alternative of refusing to cause harm re-
mains open to him.
It would be different if causing harm were out of his control. If,
having failed to restrain himself now, he had no choice as to his be-
havior in the future, then detaining himself would be the only means
for preventing the harm, and in failing to detain himself he would be
causing harm, or at least causing the risk of harm. He would be pre-
cisely like the driver who had taken a sedative before beginning to
drive; he has already done the thing that puts others at risk. It would
follow, under the circumstances, that he had the obligation to detain
himself, and punishment for not doing so might be justified. But we
have already seen that dangerousness is not the same as incompe-
tence; preventive detention, unlike involuntary commitment of the in-
competent, presupposes voluntary, responsible action.97
B. QUARANTINE
The fact that the dangerous person remains responsible for his
96 The argument is this. Suppose that it is a general principle of inference that:
From the obligation to do p at t-, and the fact that if p at t- then q at t, we may
infer the obligation to do q at t. Frorq this it follows that if I am obligated to pay loan
Li at t-, and if I can pay Li at t- only if I withhold loan 12 at t, then I am obligated
not to pay loan L2 at t. Since either of the two loans in the example may be Li and
either may be L2, it would follow from the assumption that I am obligated to pay
either that I am obligated not to pay the other. Since there is no purely logical
ground for preferring either, it would seem to follow that I am obligated to pay
neither.
97 See supra part II.B.
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behavior thus seems to raise serious difficulties for the thesis that pre-
ventive detention can be justified as punishment. Ferdinand Schoe-
man, in the article already cited, has argued that if the voluntariness
or responsibility of future actions interferes with the justification of
preventive detention, then so does it interfere with the justification of
quarantine. 98 Though Schoeman does not draw this conclusion, the
implication is strong; since most of us would agree that quarantine
may be justified, and since preventive detention and quarantine are in
the same boat, any argument against preventive detention must be
flawed.
The similarity between preventive detention and quarantine is
that in both cases we confine people on the basis of dangerousness in
the absence of fault. Since those who are contagiously ill can, if they
choose, avoid spreading their disease by avoiding contact with others,
the argument I have made against preventive detention should also,
therefore, be an argument against quarantine. There is, however, a
significant difference between preventive detention and quarantine.
While preventive detention is aimed at preventing violence that the
actor will intentionally choose to bring about, the person with a highly
contagious disease need not intend to communicate the disease or
even act in conscious disregard of the risk of spreading it. If we can
predict that she will act in that way, she will be a candidate for preven-
tive detention and not quarantine. She may communicate the disease
through negligence; indeed she may communicate it without fault,
taking all the care that she knows how to take. It may be so contagious
that there is simply no way to prevent its spread if she is in the com-
pany of others; or if there is such a way, it may be that no one knows
what it is. She may be unable to control all of the factors that influ-
ence its spread in spite of the greatest care.
If she remains in the society of others, therefore, it may be be-
yond her power to prevent the spread of the disease. Her very pres-
ence will be a threat to the safety of others. She is more like the
person who is driving while intoxicated than like the person who will
intentionally cause harm. Driving while intoxicated is itself an act that
threatens others; there is no further competent act that need inter-
vene between the driving and the resulting harm. Nothing prevents
us from deriving an obligation not to drive while intoxicated from the
obligation not to harm others. Once the intoxicated person has be-
gun to drive it is out of her control to avoid causing harm. Similarly,
there may be an obligation to seclude oneself when dangerously ill if
the disease is contagious enough, and the effects are serious enough.
98 Schoeman, supra note 85.
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Just being in the presence of others may place preventing harm out of
the control of the carrier of the disease.
There are, naturally, all sorts of contagious diseases; some are eas-
ily transmitted and others are transmitted only through identifiable,
voluntary acts. HIV may be of the latter sort; if it is, then quarantine
for HIV is subject to the same difficulties as preventive detention. By
failing to detain himself the HIV carrier is not doing something that
will cause harm to others without further voluntary intervention on
his part. Absent some better argument for punishing dangerous per-
sons, we cannotjustify punishing him for his failure to detain himself.
Other diseases, and tuberculosis may be an example, are not within
the actor's control in the same way, and in those cases quarantine is a
different matter. It is more like involuntary commitment of the in-
competent than like preventive detention. If such a person refuses to
detain himself, punishment may be perfectly appropriate.
C. COMPENSATION
This brings us to the odd conclusion that those who are likely
innocently to infect others may be detained as punishment if prevent-
ing the spread of the disease is beyond their control, while those who
would deliberately spread a less contagious disease may not. True,
this will not be a problem in practice, since the intention to spread
the disease will not normally be discovered until after an attempt has
been made to do it, at which time it can be punished as an ordinary
crime. Nevertheless, we have been supposing that dangerousness can
be predicted even when there is no present intention to harm, and it
seems counterintuitive to suppose that we may punish those whose
dangerousness lies in perfectly innocent behavior, while those we may
predict will try deliberately to spread their disease may not be pun-
ished so long as they have not' yet made the attempt.
Though I am not now prepared to develop it further, the solu-
tion, I think, is this: to state that preventive detention is notjustifiable
(or has not been shown to be justifiable) as punishment is not to say
that it is never justified at all. Detention is a taking of freedom, and
there are other grounds on which such takings can be justified. The
community is sometimes entitled to requisition resources even if the
owner of the resources has not abandoned his right to them, if (1)
they are required for the prevention of serious harm to the commu-
nity, and (2) the owner is fully compensated. The difference between
a taking away of freedom in the name of punishment and a taking
away of freedom for the common good is a little like the difference
between self-defense and necessity, and it is significant in this respect:
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although a taking away of freedom as punishment does not require
compensation, taking for the common good is commonly believed to
require compensation.
If I take something from another in self-defense-if I destroy his
gun, for example, to keep him from shooting me-I do not owe him
compensation. The injury he has suffered is one he has brought on
himself, and significantly it is one that he could have avoided by re-
fraining from doing what he had no right to do, namely trying to in-
jure me. What he has lost can therefore be chalked up to his own
responsibility. If, however, I take something from someone out of ne-
cessity-I destroy his gun using it as a hammer to hammer in the nail
that will save my dam and keep my land from flooding-I do owe
compensation. Though neither of us is presently responsible for the
harm that is about to befall me, there is no reason why he should be
made to pay for the cost of preventing my catastrophe. It is fair and
efficient to make me pay for what I use to save myself.
V. CONCLUSION
The criminal, like the aggressor, has it in his power to prevent the
injury of punishment. What he is being asked to give up for the com-
mon good is something that he has no right to anyway: his freedom to
harm others. If, to prevent him from doing harm, he must be
threatened with prison, then nothing has been taken from him that
he is entitled to. On the other hand, the innocent but dangerous
person is being asked, on behalf of the common good, to give up all
sorts of freedoms unconnected to the harming of others. He is asked
to give up his freedom to walk freely in the streets, to live where he
chooses, to visit his family, to shop, to take in a movie. It is wrong to
suppose that there are no conditions under which the state may ask
him to do that; but if it does, it is asking him to give up things to
which he is entitled for the common good. It would thus seem both
fair and efficient to compensate him for the loss of these things-fair
because he is paying out of his own resources to prevent harm to
others and efficient because if he is compensated the community will
not be likely to squander his freedom without justification.
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